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In  a class of games  including  some  Cournot  and  Bertrand  games,  a sequence  of 
plays  converges  to  the  unique  Nash  equilibrium  if  and  only  if  the  sequence  is 
“consistent  with  adaptive  learning”  according  to  the  new  definition  we  propose. 
In  the  Arrow-Debreu  model  with  gross  substitutes,  a  sequence  of  prices  con- 
verges  to  the  competitive  equilibrium  if and  only  if the  sequence  is consistent  with 
adaptive  learning  by price-setting  market  makers  for  the  individual  goods.  Similar 
results  are  obtained  for  “sophisticated”  learning.  All  the  familiar  learning  algo- 
rithms  generate  play  that  is  consistent  with  adaptive  learning.  Jotuntrl  r?f EUP 
nornic  Literuture  Classification  Numbers:  026.  021.  c  1991 Academic  Pm\\.  Inc. 
Equilibrium  analysis  dominates  the  study  of  games  of  strategy,  but 
even  many  of  its  foremost  exponents  are  troubled  by  its  assumption  that 
players  immediately  and  unerringly  identify  and  play  a particular  vector 
of  equilibrium  strategies,  that  is, by  the  assumption  that  the  equilibrium  is 
common  knowledge.’  An  alternative  (and  to  some  extent  complementary) 
approach  to  analyzing  behavior  in games  focuses  on  learning.  The  typical 
* We  thank  Xinghai  Fang  for  his  able  research  assistance,  Andreu  Mas  Cole11 and  Tom 
Sargent  for  encouraging  us to  pursue  this  subject,  and  Frank  Hahn  for  his correct  guess that 
our  theory  of  stability  in  games  with  strategic  complements  could  be  applied  to  Walrasian 
equilibrium  when  demand  satisfies  the  “gross  substitutability”  condition. 
I For  example,  see  Kreps  (1990). 
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analysis  of  this  sort  considers  the  game  being  played  repeatedly  and  posits 
some  specific  rules  according  to  which  players  form  expectations  regard- 
ing  what  others’  current  choices  will  be  as a function  of  past  plays.  As- 
suming  that  the  players  attempt  to  maximize  their  current  payoffs  given 
these  expectations  defines  a  dynamic  process  generating  a  sequence  of 
plays,  and  concern  then  centers  on  the  behavior  of  the  sequence.  Does 
play  converge  over  time?  And,  if  so,  does  it  approach  the  behavior  pre- 
dicted  by  equilibrium  analysis? 
This  approach  is as venerable  as equilibrium  analysis  itself:  Cournot’s 
study  of  duopoly  (1838)  introduced  both  the  Nash  equilibrium  and  a par- 
ticular  learning  process.  Yet  this  sort  of  analysis  is subject  to  criticisms 
that  are  perhaps  as bothersome  as those  leveled  at equilibrium  theorizing. 
Cournot  supposed  that  at  each  round  each  firm  selects  the  quantity  that 
would  maximize  its  payoff  if  its  competitors  continued  to  produce  the 
same  quantities  as at  the  preceding  round.  Now  called  “best-reply”  dy- 
namics,  this  dynamic  process  still  receives  attention  as a model  of  learn- 
ing  in  games  (e.g.,  Bernheim,  1984;  Moulin,  1986).  Yet  it  often  seems 
unreasonable  to  suppose  that  real  firms  would  behave  in  the  particular 
way  Cournot  described.  This  is especially  true  when  best-reply  dynamics 
lead  to  nonconvergent,  cycling  behavior  (as happens  for  some  specifica- 
tions  of  costs  and  demand).  When  there  is  cycling,  an  outsider  with  no 
information  about  payoffs  could  eventually  predict  the  behavior  of 
Cournot  competitors  more  accurately  than  the  firms  in  the  model  do, 
simply  by  predicting  continuation  of  the  historical  frequency  of  choices. 
Brown  (1951)  suggested  a model  in which  the  players  themselves  follow 
a similar  procedure,  that  is, they  choose  the  strategies  that  maximize  their 
individual  payoffs  given  the  prediction  that  the  probability  distribution  of 
competitor’s  play  at the  next  round  is the  same  as the  empirical  frequency 
distribution  of  past  play.  This  dynamic  model,  known  as “fictitious  play,” 
initially  led  to  encouraging  results:  Robinson  (1951)  showed  that  the  em- 
pirical  distribution  of  strategy  choices  under  fictitious  play  converges  to 
an  equilibrium  distribution  for  any  two-player,  finite-strategy,  zero-sum 
game.  However,  Shapley  (1964)  established  that,  without  the  zero-sum 
restriction,  fictitious  play  can  lead  to  cycles  of  exponentially  increasing 
length,  so  that  the  empirical  frequency  distribution  does  not  converge  at 
all.  Moreover,  the  empirical  probabilities  in the  cycles  are  bounded  away 
from  the  equilibrium  distribution  in  Shapley’s  example.  Ironically,  an 
outsider  who  wants  to  predict  the  behavior  of  players  under  fictitious  play 
* In  this  example,  the  outsider  could  be  made  into  a  player  whose  actions  (predictions)  do 
not affect  the  other  players’  payoffs  and  whose  own  payoff  is 1 for  a correct  prediction  and  0 
for  an  incorrect  one.  Then,  we  would  have  an  example  of  a game  in  which  a  player  can  do 
better,  along  the  paths  actually  generated,  by making  Cournot  forecasts  than  by forecasting 
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in  Shapley’s  example  can  hardly  do  better  than  to  employ  Cournot’s 
suggestion  of  supposing  that  each  round’s  choices  will  be  the  same  as the 
preceding  round:  In  the  long  run,  the  fraction  of  errors  made  by  such  an 
outsider  would  converge  to  zero.2 
Fictitious  play  is a  variant  of  what  one  may  call  “stationary  Bayesian 
learning,”  according  to  which  the  players  analyze  past  observations  as if 
the  behavior  of  their  competitors  were  stationary,  assigning  as  much 
weight  to  observations  from  the  distant  past  as to  more  recent  observa- 
tions.  Of  course,  the  actual  behavior  of  players  during  learning  is nonsta- 
tionary,  so  these  stationary  Bayesian  models  are  misspecified  and  may 
often  place  too  much  weight  on  distant  past  behavior.  Cournot’s  rule, 
which  bases  its  forecasts  only  on  the  competitors’  most  recent  past  play, 
lies  at  the  opposite  extreme.  A  sophisticated  player  would  be  unlikely  to 
adopt  either  kind  of  rule. 
Cycling  is not  the  only  problem  to  arise  from  learning  models.  Fuden- 
berg  and  Kreps  (1988)  have  shown  that  models  like  stationary  Bayesian 
learning  applied  in the  extensive  form  of  the  game  generate  a sequence  of 
choices  that  may  converge,  but  to  a strategy  combination  that  is different 
from  any perfect  equilibrium.  As  they  show,  the  players  in general  exten- 
sive form  games  cannot  always  learn  what  strategies  their  competitors  are 
playing,  because  a strategy  is in general  a function  from  information  sets 
to  actions  and  it  may  be  difficult  to  gather  reliable  information  about  how 
a  competitor  would  behave  at  information  sets  that  have  occurred  only 
rarely. 
Taken  together,  these  results  raise  serious  doubts  about  the  validity  of 
Nash  equilibrium  and  its  refinements  as  a  general  model  of  the  likely 
outcomes  of  adaptive  learning.  More  fundamentally,  they  indicate  that 
the  “rationality”  of  any  particular  learning  algorithm  is situation  depen- 
dent:  An  algorithm  that  performs  well  in some  situations  may  work  poorly 
in others.  Apparently,  real biological  players  tailor  rules-of-thumb  to  their 
environments  and  experience:  They  learn  how  to  learn.  Thus,  any  single, 
simple  specification  of  a  learning  algorithm  is  unlikely  to  represent  well 
the  behavior  that  actual  players  would  adopt. 
A further  troubling  aspect  of  existing  models  of learning  in games  is that 
they  all force  the  players  to  be  “unsophisticated,”  that  is, the  players  can 
use  only  information  about  past  play,  without  giving  any  weight  to  infor- 
mation  about  their  competitors’  information,  payoffs,  and  rationality.  The 
competing  approaches  of  rationahzability  (Bernheim,  1984;  Pearce,  1984) 
and  Nash  or  correlated  (Aumann,  1987)  equilibrium  lie  at  the  opposite 
extreme:  they  allow  weight  to  be  placed  only  on  payoff  information.  Real 
players  often  make  use  of  both  kinds  of  information. 
We  provide  a general  formulation  that  allows  players  to  combine  what- 
ever  they  may  know  about  the  past  history  of  play  with  whatever  they 
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and  rationality  to  form  a forecast  of  future  play.  Our  approach  is flexible 
enough  to  encompass  bounded  rationality  of  the  kind  implicit  in  best- 
reply  dynamics  and  stationary  Bayesian  learning,  but  it also  applies  when 
players  are  more  sophisticated.  It  encompasses  processes  in  which  the 
players  can  identify  cyclical  patterns  in  past  play  and  others  in  which 
players  learn  about  which  of  several  forecasting  models  work  best.  In  the 
latter  case,  the  players  might  track  and  compare  the  performance  of  nu- 
merous  alternative  forecasting  models  over  time,  using  past  performance 
to  select  among  them  or  even  to  form  some  weighted-average  consensus 
forecast  to  guide  their  strategy  choices  at  the  current  stage.  Intelligent 
people  employ  a  variety  of  learning  strategies,  and  in  constructing  our 
general  theory  we  have  strived  to  encompass  them  all. 
To  achieve  the  desired  degree  of  generality,  we  avoid  any  detailed 
description  of  how  the  players  actually  reach  their  decisions.  Instead,  we 
focus  on  the  sequence  of  plays  over  time.  For  an individual  player  IZ, such 
a  sequence  is  denoted  by  {x&)},  where  for  each  t  in  the  (discrete  or 
continuous)  index  set,  x,(t)  is  a  pure  strategy.  We  then  identify  two 
properties  which  these  sequences  might  satisfy-one  property  each  for 
“adaptive”  and  “sophisticated”  learning.  One  or  the  other  of  these  prop- 
erties  is satisfied  under  all of the  various  more  specific  models  of  learning. 
We  take  these  as defining  when  the  observed  sequence  is consistent  with 
learning. 
Roughly,  bn(t))  is “consistent  with  adaptive  learning”  if  player  n euen- 
tually  chooses  only  strategies  that  are  nearfy  best-replies  to  some  proba- 
bility  distribution  over  his  competitors’  joint  strategies,  where  near  zero 
probability  is assigned  to  strategies  that  have  not  been  played  for  a sufJ;- 
ciently  long  time.  Similarly,  {xJt)}  is  “consistent  with  sophisticated 
learning”  if  the  player  eventually  chooses  only  nearly  best-replies  to  his 
probabilistic  forecast  of  competitors’  choices,  where  the  support  of  the 
probability  distribution  may  include  not  only  past  plays  but  also  strategies 
that  the  competitors  might  choose  if  they  themselves  are  adaptive  or 
sophisticated  learners.  Thus,  any  process  {xn(t)}  that  is  consistent  with 
adaptive  learning  is also  consistent  with  sophisticated  learning.  Sophisti- 
cated  learning  models  allow  the  player  to  make  full  use of  any  information 
gleaned  from  past  play,  but  they  also  allow  the  player  to  assimilate  fully 
the  same  kind  of  payoff  information  that  is used  in  equilibrium  analyses. 
Sophisticated  learning  is differentiated  from  equilibrium  analysis  because 
no  fulfilled  expectations  assumption  is imposed. 
The  analysis  is set  in  a class  of  finite-player  games  with  compact  strat- 
egy  sets  and  continuous  payoffs.  The  results  we  report  are  of  three  types. 
First  are  results  about  what  is included  in the  class of  processes  consistent 
with  adaptive  learning.  For  example,  we  prove  that  if  a  sequence  of 
strategy  profiles  {x,(t)}  converges  to  a (Nash  or  correlated)  equilibrium, 
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cannot  obtain  positive  equilibrium  convergence  results  with  a  broader 
class  of  learning  models  than  the  ones  that  we  analyze.  We  also  present  a 
theorem  about  a  class  of  algorithms  that  includes  all  the  specific  ones 
described  above,  showing  that  these  always  generate  play  that  is consis- 
tent  with  adaptive  learning.  Second,  we  report  results  about  the  implica- 
tions  of  adaptive  and  sophisticated  learning:  Given  any  process  consistent 
with  adaptive  learning,  play  tends  toward  the  serially  undominated  set, 
namely,  the  set of  strategies  that  remain  after  iterated  elimination  of  each 
player’s  strongly  dominated  strategies.3  In  particular,  for  games  that  have 
but  one  serially  undominated  strategy  profile,  every  process  consistent 
with  adaptive  learning  converges  to  the  unique  serially  undominated  pro- 
file.  Third,  we  report  results  that  we  and  others  have  obtained  elsewhere 
about  the  many  examples  in economics  in  which  the  serially  undominated 
set  is a singleton  and  for  which  our  results  on  the  convergence  of  learning 
processes  are  especially  germane. 
In  Section  1 below,  we  state  the  definitions  and  prove  the  theorems 
described  above,  which  were  developed  with  deterministic  learning 
models  in  mind.  In  Section  2,  we  study  a  stochastic  learning  model  in 
which  the  players  experiment  and  show  how  to  include  it  in  our  general 
framework,  so that  play  eventually  converges  in an  appropriate  probabi- 
listic  sense  toward  the  serially  undominated  set.  Some  important  eco- 
nomic  applications  are  developed  in  Section  3. 
1.  FORMULATIONANDMAIN  THEOREMS 
We  begin  with  a noncooperative  game  I  = (N,  (S, ; n  E N),  7~), where  N 
is the  finite  player  set,  S, is player  n’s  strategy  set with  typical  element  x,, 
and  7~  is the  payoff  function.  We  assume  that  each  S, is a compact  subset 
of  some  normed  space.  Let  S =  xEEN S,.  A  typical  element  of  x  E  S is 
often  usefully  written  as x  = (x,  , x -,),  where  x -,, designates  the  strategy 
choices  of  everyone  besides  player  n.  The  payoff  function  rr:  S +  RN 
specifies  a  payoff  ~T,(x,,  X-J  for  each  player  n;  we  assume  it  to  be 
continuous.  Given  a set  T, let  A(T)  denote  the  set of  probability  distribu- 
tions  over  T;  for  example,  A(S,)  denotes  the  set  of  probability  distribu- 
tions  on  S,  (mixed  strategies).  Also,  let  A-,&J  =  Xj+,, A(q)  denote  the 
mixed  strategies  of  n’s  competitors.  In  the  usual  way,  we  may  identify 
any  pure  strategy  with  the  mixed  strategy  that  assigns  it probability  one, 
and  we  may  correspondingly  extend  the  domain  of  7~  to  include  the  mixed 
strategies. 
3 For  two-player  finite  games,  the  serially  undominated  strategies  are  the  same  as  the 
rationalizable  strategies  of  Bemheim  (1984)  and  Pearce  (1984).  When  there  are  more  than 
two  players,  the  serially  undominated  set is,  in  general,  larger  than  the  rationalizable  set. 
GUI (1990) has independently  developed  a theory  similar  to  ours  that emphasizes  the  rationa- 
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A strategy  x,  E  S, is &-dominated  by  another  strategy  X,  E A@,)  if  for 
all Z-,,  E  S-,,  rTT,(x,,  Z-J  +  E <  r,,(X,,  z-,).  Being  E-dominated  is more 
than  being  strongly  dominated;  it  requires  that  x,  would  still  be  strongly 
dominated  even  if  E  were  added  to  all the  payoffs  that  could  result  from  its 
being  played. 
Given  any  set  T  c  S,  let  T,, denote  the  projection  of  T onto  S,.  Let 
T-,  =  Xj+n  Tj.  Much  of  our  analysis  centers  on  the  following  operator: 
DEFINITION.  Given  T  c  S,  let 
U;(T)  =  {x,,  E  S,  1  WY,,  E  W,))(~Z-,  E  T-n)  TAX,,  z-,) 
+  E 2  7TAYr2,  Z-n)) 
U”(T)  =  x,E,v  U;(T). 
The  letter  U  is mnemonic  for  undominated.  The  set  U:(T)  is the  set  of 
pure  strategies  in S, that  are  not  E-dominated  when  each  other  player  m is 
limited  to  strategies  in  T,,, . If  a player  n believes  that  each  other  player  m 
will  choose  strategies  in  T,,  then  it  would  be  “unjustified”  or  “irra- 
tional”  for  n to  play  any  strategy  not  in  U”,(T),  for  every  such  strategy  is 
strongly  dominated  (and  more!)  by  some  other  strategy. 
LEMMA  1.  The  operator  U”  is monotone:  If  R and  Tare  sets of  strat- 
egy  profiles  with  R  c  T,  then  I/“(R)  C  V(T). 
The  proof  of  Lemma  1 follows  directly  from  the  definition  of  u”.  Ex- 
cept  in the  applications,  monotonicity  of  UE is the  only  property  we  shall 
use,  so we  cast  the  analysis  entirely  in  terms  of  monotone  operators. 
Note  that  the  definition  of  UC allows  the  possibility  that  for  some  set of 
profiles  T,  U”(T)  Qt T.  In  particular,  if  we  begin  from  some  arbitrary  set 
TC  x  ,,eN S, and  proceed  to  apply  u”  in an  iterative  fashion,  it is possible 
that  some  strategies  not  in  Twill  be introduced  somewhere  in the  process. 
Nevertheless,  as the  following  lemma  verifies,  if  T =  S, the  entire  strategy 
space,  this  cannot  occur:  U&%Y),  the  kth  iterate  of  u”(S),  is the  outcome 
of  k  rounds  of  crossing  out  E-dominated  strategies  starting  from  S,  be- 
cause  when  the  starting  set  is S,  no  crossed-out  strategy  is ever  reintro- 
duced  . 
LEMMA  2.  For  any  monotone  operator  J andfor  all  k L  0, Jk+‘(S)  c 
Jk(S). 
Proof.  The  conclusion  is obvious  for  k = 0.  Suppose  it holds  for  k = j, 
so that  Jj+l(S)  G Jj(S).  Then  by  monotonicity  of  J,  Jj+2(S)  C Jj+*(S).  w 
In  view  of  Lemma  2,  it  is natural  to  define  J”(S)  as follows: 
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It  is  in  terms  of  U””  that  we  define  the  serially  undominated  strategy 
sets. 
DEFINITION.  The  strategy  profile  x is said  to  be serially  undominated 
if  x  E  U@(S). 
We  may  use  the  operators  U”  to  define  what  we  mean  by  adaptive 
learning.  The  first  definition  holds  that  the  process  {x(t)}  is consistent  with 
adaptive  learning  if  each  player  can  eventually  find  a way  to  justify  its 
choices  in  terms  of  the  competitors’  past  play. 
DEFINITIONS.  A  sequence  of  strategies  {xn(t)}  is  consistent  with 
adaptive  learning  by  player  n if  (Vs  > O)(Vf)(3i)(Vt  2  f)  xn(t)  E  Ui({x(s)  ( 
t^ 5  s  <  t}).  A  sequence  of  strategy  projiles  {x(t)}  is  consistent  with 
adaptive  learning  if  each  {xn(t)}  has  the  property. 
For  games  with  finite  strategy  spaces,  {xn(t)}  is consistent  with  adaptive 
learning  if  and  only  if  the  condition  in  the  definition  holds  with  E =  0, 
leading  to  a simpler  theory.  For  infinite  games,  however,  adaptive  learn- 
ing  is somewhat  more  inclusive. 
Let  Gi  be  the  empirical  distribution  of  player  n’s  choices  up  to  and 
including  date  t,  GC,  the  empirical  joint  distribution  of  the  other  player’s 
choices,  and  G’ the  empirical  joint  distribution  of  all the  players’  choices. 
DEFINITION.  A sequence  of profiles  {x(t)}  converges  omitting  correfa- 
tion  to a correlated  strategy  profile  G E A(S) if  (1) and  (2) hold,  where:  (1) 
Gi converges  weakly  to  the  marginal  distribution  G,  for  all n and  (2) (Vs > 
0)(3i)(Vt  2  i)(Vn)  d[x,(t),  supp(G,)]  <  E, where  d(x,  T)  = infyET 11x  -  ~11. 
The  sequence  converges  to  the  correlated  strategy  G  E A(S)  if,  in  addi- 
tion,  G’ converges  weakly  to  G. 
The  definition  implies  in  particular  that  a  sequence  {x(t)}  converges 
omitting  correlation  to  a mixed  strategy  Nash  equilibrium  if  it  replicates 
the  empirical  frequency  of  the  separate  mixed  strategies  and  if  it  eventu- 
ally  plays  only  pure  strategies  that  are  in  or  near  the  support  of  the 
equilibrium  mixed  strategies.  Full  convergence  requires  in  addition  that 
the  correlation  among  the  individual  strategies  be  replicated  asymptoti- 
tally  . 
THEOREM  3.  (i) Zf  {x(t)}  converges  omitting  correlation  to a correlated 
equilibrium  in the  game  r,  then  {x(t)}  is consistent  with  adaptive  learning. 
(ii) Suppose  that  the  sequence  {x(t)}  is consistent  with  adaptive  learn- 
ing  and  that  it  converges  to  a point  x *.  Then  x*  is a pure  strategy  Nash 
equilibrium. 
Theorem  3 is elementary,  and  we  omit  its  proof.  Part  (i) of  the  theorem 
is about  the  inclusiveness  of  our  definitions;  anything  that  converges  to  a 
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important  excluded  case:  adaptive  learning  excludes  any  sequence  that 
converges  to  any  pure  strategy  profile  other  than  a Nash  equilibrium. 
For  players  who  know  the  payoff  functions,  even  the  relatively  weak 
restrictions  of  adaptive  learning  may  be  too  severe  to  encompass  all  “ra- 
tional”  behavior.  For  example,  in  a  three-player  game,  if  player  3  has 
played  a strategy  at  date  r that  it  had  never  played  before,  then  player  1 
might  anticipate  the  possibility  that  player  2 will  introduce  a new  strategy 
next  period  that  performs  better  against  3’s  possible  new  pattern  of  play. 
Of  course,  in the  usual  fashion  of  game-theoretic  reasoning,  2 might  antic- 
ipate  l’s  response  in  deciding  on  its  own  choice,  and  more  rounds  of 
reasoning  might  be  required. 
To  accommodate  these  possibilities,  we  must  introduce  some  notation. 
Let  P”(i,  t)  =  U”({x(s)  1 i  _  -C s  <  t})  and,  for  k  B  1,  let  P(i,  t)  = 
U”(F”,k-’  (i,  t)  U  {x(s)  1 t^ I  s <  t}).  The  FGk notation  is mnemonic  for  k- 
step  forward  looking.  Thus,  the  Fe0  notation  can  be  used  to  describe 
adaptive  rules,  which  are  O-step  forward  looking:  the  players  make 
choices  that  are justified  in terms  of  competitors’  past  play.  The  profiles  in 
F”‘(?,  t) are  those  that  can  be justified  by  players  who  think  like  player  1 in 
the  discussion  in  the  last  paragraph.  As  we  add  more  possible  rounds  to 
the  reasoning  process,  the  set of  possible  justifications  for  any  particular 
choice  at  time  t  expands  and  so  the  set  of  possible  justifiable  choices 
expands  as  well.  The  following  lemma  verifies  that  our  mathematical 
formulation  captures  that  intuition. 
LEMMA  4.  For  all  k  2  0,  FEk(i,  t)  C  FE,k+*(t^, t), 
Proof.  Fix  (i,  t).  It  is immediate  from  the  definitions  that  Feo(t^, t)  c 
F”‘(i,  t).  Applying  the  monotonicity  of  U”  inductively,  Fek(i,  t)  c 
FE*k+‘(i,  t).  n 
Whereas  adaptive  learning  was  defined  to  include  only  processes  that 
justify  choices  in terms  of  past  play,  we  now  define  sophisticated  learning 
to  be  more  inclusive.  It  incorporates  the  possibility  that  a  player  may 
forecast  its  competitors’  behavior  based  jointly  on  how  all  the  players 
(including  itself)  have  acted  in  the  past  and  on  what  all their  payoffs  are. 
(The  player’s  own  past  actions  and  current  payoffs  may  influence  its 
competitors’  current  choices,  and  the  player  may  recognize  that.)  More- 
over,  it  imposes  no  a priori  restrictions  on  the  number  of  iterations  of  the 
“he  may  think  that  I  may  think  that  .  .  .”  style  of  reasoning  that  is  so 
central  in  rationalizability  and  traditional  equilibrium  analyses. 
DEFINITION.  A  sequence  of  strategies  {x,(t)}  is  consistent  with  so- 
phisticated  learning  if  (VE >  O)(V~)(%)(Vt  >  i)  x,(t)  E  U:(F@(i,  t)), 
where 
FE”@,  t)  =  u  FEk(i,  t), 
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and  the  sequence  of  profiles  {x(t)}  is consistent  with  sophisticated  learn- 
ing  if  each  {x,(t)}  had  the  property  or,  equivalently,  if  (VC > O)(Vi)@r)(Vt 
>  t)  x(t)  E  Fyi,  1). 
Sophisticated  learners  are  not  necessarily  more  successful  than  adap- 
tive  learners.  For  example,  in the  Battle  of  the  Sexes  game  shown  below, 
L  R 
u  2,l  0,o 
D  0,o  I,2 
the  process  {x(t)}  in  which  x(t)  =  (D,  L)  for  all  t  is consistent  with  “so- 
phisticated  learning,”  because  each  player  is permitted  to  forecast  that 
the  other  will  recognize  its true  interest  and  switch  at the  next  round.  (Of 
course,  as  Theorem  5  showed,  no  such  outcome  is  possible  when  the 
process  is  consistent  with  adaptive  learning.)  Although  sophisticated 
learning  does  not  ensure  that  only  Nash  equilibria  can  be  limit  points  of 
the  process,  it  does  impose  some  restrictions. 
THEOREM  5.  Let  {x(t)}  be  consistent  with  sophisticated  learning. 
Then,  for  each  E >  0 and  k there  exists  a time  t& after  which  (i.e.,  for  t  2 
t&)  x(t)  E  UEk(S). 
Proof.  Fix  any  E >  0  and  write  tk  instead  of  tsk.  For  k  =  0,  the 
conclusion  holds  trivially  (choosing  to = 0).  Suppose  the  conclusion  holds 
for  k  = j.  Then,  there  is a  tj  such  that  for  all  t  2  tj,  {X(S)  1  tj  5  s  5  t}  C 
W(S). 
By  hypothesis,  the  process  is  consistent  with  sophisticated  learning. 
So,  in  the  definition  of  such  processes,  we  may  let  i =  tj  and  we  may  take  n  - 
tj+l  =  max(t,  t).  Let  t  Z  fj+l*  Then,  x(t)  E F”“(tj,  t) and  we  want  to  show 
that  F”“(tj,  t)  c  (U&)j+r(s).  We  show,  equivalently,  that  F”‘(tj,  t)  c 
(ve)j+l(s)  for  all i. 
For  i =  0, F”O(tj,  t)  =  U”({X(S)  / t,j I  s  I  t})  5  U’[Ud(S)]  = (UE)j”(S), 
by  monotonicity  of  U”.  Suppose  the  conclusion  is true  for  i. In  particular, 
by  Lemma  2,  (U&(j+‘(S)  C  (UE)J’(S).  Then,  by  monotonicity  of  U”, 
FE’i+‘(fj,  1)  =  U”(F”‘(fj,  1)  U  {X(S)  1 tj  5G  S  Y5  t})  c  U’[U’j(S)] 
=  (uE)j+l(s).  n 
COROLLARY  6.  Let  {x(t)}  be  consistent  with  sophisticated  learning 
and  let  S,” be the  set  of  strategies  that  are  played  injinitely  many  times  in 
CX,~(~)>.  Then,  x ,EN Sr  C  U”“(S).  In  particular,  for  anyjinite  game  r,  ull 
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Proof.  Applying  Theorem  5,  S”  C  13,  13.,~) Us%‘)  =  13x CPx(S)  = 
lP(S).  n 
THEOREM 7.  Suppose  Uom(S) = {X}.  Then  Ilx(t)  -  Xl/ +  0 ifand  only  if 
{x(t)}  is consistent  with  adaptive  learning.  Similarly,  11x(t) -  XII*  0 ifand 
only  if  {x(t)}  is consistent  with  sophisticated  learning. 
Proof.  Suppose  [lx(t)  -  Xl]  +  0.  Since  IT  is  continuous,  (VE  > 
0)(3i)(Vt  >  i)(Vn  E  N), 
TAX,(~), x-,W>  -  max{~,(y,,  x-,(i))  I yn E SJ  <  [~,(3  + c/21 
-  [max{7rn(yn,  X-J  ] yn E  S,}  -  c/2]  =  E. 
Hence,  x,(t)  E  U;({x(i)})  C  Uz({x(s)  I i I  s <  t}).  Then,  x(t)  E FOE& t), 
which  establishes  that  convergence  can  occur  only  if  {X(I)}  is  consistent 
with  adaptive  learning  and  hence  only  if  it is consistent  with  sophisticated 
learning. 
For  the  “if”  part,  let  x*  be  an  accumulation  point  of  {x(t)}  and  assume 
that  {x(t)}  is consistent  with  (adaptive  or)  sophisticated  learning.  By  The- 
orem  5, (Vk)(%)(Vt  >  i) x(t)  E  W(S).  By  Lemma  2 and  the  compactness 
of  P$s), 
x”  E  ne>o  l-l;=,  cP(S) 
= f-7;=,  n..,  U~qs) = l!I.P(S)  = {T}, 
where  the  reversal  of  intersections  is justified  because  U%Y)  is doubly 
monotone  (decreasing  in  k,  increasing  in  E).  n 
Although  our  formulation  of  learning  allows  the  possibility  that  players 
may  be  learning  how  to  optimize  in  addition  to  learning  what  to  expect 
from  competitors,4  all the  studies  and  algorithms  cited  in the  introduction 
assume  that  players  are  always  able  to  optimize  given  their  possibly  inac- 
curate  forecasts.  To  establish  that  our  theory  subsumes  these  earlier 
ones,  let  pn denote  a forecasting  algorithm  for  player  n,  so that  ~,,(a / x(s); 
s  <  t)  is  a  probability  distribution  over  S-,  representing  what  player  n 
expects  to  be  played  at  date  t given  the  history  of  play  (including  his  own 
play)  up  to  that  date.  Let  A:  be  a  learning  algorithm  that  makes  the 
optimizing  choices  associated  with  p,  that  is,  A{[x(s);  s  <  t]  E  argmax 
E{QT,(x,,  X-J  1  p,[*  (  x(s);  s < t]}.  Best-reply  dynamics,  fictitious  play,  and 
many  others  are  algorithms  of  this  sort. 
For  simplicity,  let  us restrict  attention  here  to games  with  finite  strategy 
sets and  to learning  that  occurs  in  discrete  time.  Then,  in a small stretch  of 
4 In  some  environments,  this  extension  allows  us to  encompass  “genetic  algorithms”  of 
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terminology,  we  may  say  that  the  forecasting  algorithm  p,,  is adaptive  if 
for  any  strategy  X,  of  any  player  m  #  II that  is played  only  finitely  many 
times  in  the  sequence  {x(t)},  pn(x,  / x(s);  s  <  t)  converges  to  zero  as 
t *  03.5 
THEOREM  8.  Let  pn  be  an  adaptive  forecasting  algorithm.  Then  for 
any  sequence  of  opposing  strategy  projiles  {x-,(t)},  the  induced  sequence 
{x,&N = {A:[x(s); s < tl) is consistent  with  adaptive  learning. 
The  proof  of  Theorem  8 for  this  finite  strategy  case  is obvious:  Player 
n’s  choices  under  A:  are  eventually  best-responses  to  some  probability 
distribution  over  those  opposing  strategies  that  will  be  played  infinitely 
often.  Thus,  for  all 7, the  choices  {x,Jt)}  lie eventually  in  Ui({x(s)  1  i I  s I 
t}),  which  is the  definition  of  the  phrase  “{xn(t)}  is consistent  with  adap- 
tive  learning.” 
Since  the  forecasts  implicit  in  Cournot’s  best-reply  dynamics,  Brown’s 
fictitious  play,  and  Bayesian  learning  are  all adaptive,  our  theory  contains 
those  examples  as  special  cases.  Similarly,  if  a player  were  to  use  Bay- 
esian  statistical  methods,  for  example,  to  estimate  a  matrix  whose  ele- 
ments  are  the  conditional  probabilities  that  a  particular  profile  x-,  is 
played  given  a specification  of  the  k previous  plays  {x(t  -  k),  .  .  .  , x(t  - 
l)},  the  forecasts  would  be  adaptive.  This  example  illustrates  how  our 
theory  encompasses  learning  strategies  that  can  recognize  cycles.  Fur- 
thermore,  if  {p;,  .  .  .  , p”,}  is  a  set  of  adaptive  forecasting  algorithms, 
then  one  can verify  that  any  algorithm  q,, whose  forecasts  always  lie in the 
convex  hull  of  those  generated  by  the  set  {pt,  .  .  .  ,  pi}  is  another 
adaptive  forecasting  algorithm.  This  means  that  any  procedure  for  select- 
ing  among  or  weighting  the  forecasts  of  a finite  set of  adaptive  forecasting 
algorithms,  for  example,  on  the  basis  of  past  performance,  is  another 
adaptive  forecasting  algorithm:  Learning  how  to  forecast  is  consistent 
with  adaptive  learning. 
2.  STOCHASTIC LEARNING  PROCESSES  INVOLVING  EXPERIMENTATION 
So far,  we  have  formulated  our  concepts  so that  if occasional  mistakes 
are  made  over  an  infinite  horizon,  then  play  is inconsistent  with  adaptive 
learning  even  if  the  mistakes  eventually  become  very  rare.  This  formula- 
tion  is at  odds  with  the  idea  that  learning  might  be  based  on  experimenta- 
tion-an  idea  that  has  recently  been  incorporated  in  a  formal  model  by 
Fudenberg  and  Kreps  (1988). 
s  For  the  general  case  of  compact  strategy  sets  and  time  which  may  be  modeled  as 
continuous,  we  may  define  p  to  be  an  adaptive  forecasting  algorithm  if  the  probability 
assigned  to  any  compact  set  of  strategies  from  which  no  plays  are  chosen  after  some  date  i 
converges  to  zero  as  t  goes  to  infinity.  With  this  definition,  Theorem  8  can  be  proved  for  the 
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Let  I’  be  a  noncooperative  game  with  a  finite  player  set  and  a  finite 
strategy  set S. We  follow  Fudenberg  and  Kreps  (1988)  in supposing  that  at 
each  date  t,  player  n  conducts  an  experiment  with  probability  .s,t in  an 
attempt  to  learn  its  best  play.  Player  11’s decision  to  experiment  at  any 
date  is assumed  to  be  independent  of  any  contemporaneous  decisions  of 
the  other  players,  and  n’s  experiments  eventually  become  rare  (enr --;, 0 as 
t  t  03). However,  the  number  of  experiments  that  player  n  conducts 
eventually  is infinite  (Et  .snt =  03). This  latter  assumption  ensures  that  the 
player  experiments  often  enough  that  if  its  competitors’  behavior  ever 
settles  down  to  a  stationary  distribution,  the  player  would  learn  to  play  a 
best  reply.  We  assume  that  when  the  player  experiments,  it  selects  each 
of  its  finite  number  of  strategies  with  equal  probability. 
Suppose  that  when  player  n  does  not  experiment  at  a  given  date,  it 
picks  a strategy  that  is among  those  with  the  highest  average  payoff  on 
past  dates  of  experimentation.  Adaptive  behavior  of  this  general  kind 
might  be  sensible  if  the  player  has  no  idea  what  the  environment  is like, 
how  many  players  there  may  be,  what  strategies  they  have  played  at  any 
round,  or  even  whether  a  game  against  maximizing  players  is  being 
played,  but  knows  only  what  strategies  it  has  played  and  what  payoffs  it 
has  earned  on  the  dates  when  it  has  experimented.  Given  any  realization 
w of  the  player’s  randomized  choices,  let  {t(k,  w)}  be  the  subsequence  of 
dates  at  which  player  12  conducts  no  experiment. 
THEOREM  9.  For  anyfinite  strategy  game  r,  the  sequence  {x,(t(k,  w))} 
constructed  as  described  above  is consistent  with  adaptive  learning  (al- 
most  surely). 
The  proof  is given  in  the  Appendix. 
In  formulating  Theorem  9,  we  have  assumed  that  at  each  date  player  n 
uses  only  information  about  the  payoffs  earned  at  dates  ofexperimenta- 
tion.  The  reader  is warned  that  the  extension  to  the  case where  the  play- 
ers  use information  about  the  strategies  they  have  chosen  and  the  payoffs 
they  have  earned  at  all  dates  is not  straightforward.  Because  the  player 
randomizes  strategy  choices  at  dates  of  experimentation  but  not  at  other 
dates,  naive  estimates  based  on  the  payoffs  at  the  experimentation  dates 
are  always  unbiased.  A  player  who  wishes  to  take  advantage  of  experi- 
ence  gained  at  other  dates  may  need  to  use  sophisticated  statistical  tech- 
niques  to  avoid  having  the  estimates  contaminated  by  selection  bias. 
3.  APPLICATIONS 
The  key  to  the  applications  of  this  theory  lies  in  an investigation  of  the 
sets  V’(S).  For  a game  with  N  players  each  having  k  strategies,  if  the 
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tion,  then  the  expected  number  of  strongly  dominated  strategies  can  be 
shown  to  be  equal  to  N(k  -  1)1?-~.  , which  tends  to  zero  as k and  N  grow 
large.  So,  for  “generic  large  games,”  there  are  usually  no  strongly  domi- 
nated  strategies,  and  then  no  general  restrictions  are  implied  by  our  the- 
ory  about  which  strategies  can  be  played  infinitely  often.  Nevertheless, 
for  many  game  models  that  have  attracted  the  interest  of  applied  research- 
ers,  our  theory  does  imply  surprisingly  strong  restrictions. 
An  important  class  of  games  for  which  our  theory  is useful  is the  class 
of  “games  with  strategic  complementarities,”  as  variously  defined  by 
several  authors.  This  class  includes  the  supermodular  games  of  Topkis 
(1979)  and  Vives  (1990),  in  which  the  strategy  sets  are  complete  lattices6 
and  the  incremental  return  to  any  player  from  increasing  his  strategy  in 
the  lattice  order  is a nondecreasing  function  of  the  strategy  choices  of  the 
other  players.  Membership  in  this  class  of  games  is often  easy  to  check. 
Indeed,  if  the  payoff  functions  are  smooth  and  (as in  many  applications) 
the  strategy  spaces  are  compact  intervals  in  R,  then  r  is a supermodular 
game  if  and  only  if  &r,J&K,,&x,,,  2  0 for  all m  #  n. 
Milgrom  and  Roberts  (1990)  (hereafter  denoted  as  MR)  use  a  more 
inclusive  definition,  defining  a game  as having  strategic  complementarities 
if  there  exist  any  strictly  increasing  functions.6,  such  that  the  game  with 
the  transformed  payoffsJ;,(r,,(x,,  , x .~,,))  is a supermodular  game.  Milgrom 
and  Shannon  (1991)  (hereafter  MS)  provide  a  still  more  inclusive  (but 
harder  to  check)  definition.  For  the  case  where  the  strategy  sets  are 
totally  ordered  (e.g.,  subsets  of  the  real  line),  they  define  the  class  of 
games  with  strategic  complementarities  as those  for  which  the  following 
(“single-crossing”)  conditions  hold: 
For  all X, y  E  S with  x  2  y,’ 
[rn(xn,  Y-J  2  T,(Y,,  Y-AI  3  [T&,,  X-J  2  T,(Y,,  ~41  and 
[~n(Xn,  Y-n)  >  7T,(Yn,  Y-J  3  [n&n,  x-n)  >  7Tn(Yn, x-,)1. 
For  the  analysis  of  these  games,  we may  define  monotone  operators  UP 
(mnemonic  for  undominuted  in pure  strategies)  and Z (mnemonic  for  inter- 
val),  as follows. 
DEFINITIONS.  Given  T C  S,  let 
(I)  [T]  =  {x  E  S 1 inf(T)  5  x  5  sup(T)} 
(2)  UP,(T)  =  {x,,  E  S,,  1 WY,,  E  Sr,)(3-,,  E  L,)  n-Ax,,  z-n)  2 
DAY,,  7  Z-J 
6 A  complete  lattice  is a partially  ordered  set S, with  the  property  that  every  subset  T, has 
an  infimum  and  a  supremum  in  S, . 
’  For  our  applications  here,  this  may  be  read  as a  simple  vector  inequality,  where  each 
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(3)  up(T)  =  XnEN  UP,(T) 
(4) Z(T)  =  UP(m). 
The  operator  Z will  be  especially  useful  in  studying  learning  rules  in 
which  the  player  is allowed  to  reason  in  the  following  kind  of  way:  “My 
competitor  has  set  prices  of  5 and  6  in  the  past  two  periods,  so it  seems 
reasonable  to  entertain  the  possibility  that  it  might  set some  price  between 
5 and  6 in the  current  period.”  Similarly,  “Since  I have  set prices  of  3 and 
4  in  the  past  two  periods,  my  competitors  might  expect  me  to  set  some 
price  between  3 and  4 next  period,  and  might  respond  accordingly.” 
Since Z is the  composition  of  the  two  monotone  operators  UP(.)  and  [.I, 
Z is itself  a monotone  operator.  So,  by  the  very  same  arguments  that  we 
have  used  in  Theorem  5  for  the  operator  U,  if  the  players  eventually 
choose  the  strategy  profile  x(r)  from  the  set  Z({x(s);  t  2  s  2  t^}>, play 
eventually  lies  in  the  set  Zk(s).  How  large  is this  set?  The  next  two  theo- 
rems  provide  the  answer. 
THEOREM  10.  Let  I7  be  a  game  with  strategic  complementarities. 
Then,  both  _x =  inf(Z”(S))  and  X  =  sup(Z”(S))  are  pure  strategy  Nash 
equilibrium  projiles  (and  therefore  elements  of  Uooo(S)). 
Proofs  of  Theorem  10 are  given  in  MR  and  MS,  using  their  respective 
definitions  of  the  phrase  “strategic  compementarities.” 
THEOREM  11.  Let  r  be  a game  with  strategic  compementarities  and 
let  PNE  denote  the  set  of  pure  Nash  equilibrium  profiles.  Then,  the 
bounds  on  joint  behavior  predicted  by  the  various  ‘tjusti$cation”  con- 
cepts  coincide: 
[UO”(S)]  =  [UP=(S)]  =  [Z=(S)]  =  [PNEI. 
Proof.  Since  for  all T,  UO(T) c  UP(T)  C  Z(T) and  since  the  operators 
are  all monotone  nondecreasing,  it follows  by  induction  on  k that  for  all T, 
Uok(T)  C  UPk(T)  C  Zk(T) and  hence  that  U&(S)  C  UP”(S)  c  Z”(S).  Using 
the  notation  and  results  of  Theorem  9, b,  X} c  V@(S)  and  Z”(S)  =  [b,  X}] 
=  [PNE].  Applying  the  monotone  operator  [*I  to  these  inclusions  yields 
Lb, 211  C [U@Wl C [UP”(S)1  C [Z”(S)1  = [[{z, X)11  = [Cx,  41 = [PAW, 
where  the  next-to-last  equality  follows  from  the  fact  that  for  all T, inf([T]) 
=  inf(T)  and  sup([Tj)  =  sup(T).  w 
We  will  illustrate  the  power  of  these  theorems  with  a  series  of  three 
applications,  in  each  of  which  the  serially  undominated  set  U”“(S)  is  a 
singleton.  It  follows  that  for  each  application,  there  exists  a unique  Nash 
equilibrium  and  that  {x(t)}  converges  to  this  equilibrium  if  and  only  if  it  is 
consistent  with  adaptive  learning  (and  if  and  only  if  it  is consistent  with 
sophisticated  learning).  Additional  applications  can  be  found  in  MR  and 
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EXAMPLE  1:  COURNOT'S  DUOPOLY MODEL.  Let  the  market  demand 
function  be  given  by  P  = f(Q),  where  f(*>  is continuous  and  decreasing 
and  where  f’(Q)  +  Qfll(Q)  is  nowhere  positive.  Following  Cournot,  let 
the  two  market  participants  have  zero  costs  of  production  and  suppose 
that  the  strategy  spaces  are  specified  as S,  =  [O,a.  Then,  essentially  as 
Moulin  (1986,  Chap.  6)  has  shown,  U@(S)  is  a  singleton  (the  game  is 
“dominance  solvable”)s  and  so  Theorem  7  applies:  all  behavior  that  is 
consistent  with  adaptive  or  sophisticated  learning  converges  to  the  unique 
Nash  equilibrium.  This  significantly  expands  Cournot’s  conclusion  that 
the  quantities  chosen  using  best-reply  dynamics  converge  to  the  unique 
equilibrium  in  the  Cournot  game. 
EXAMPLE  2:  BERTRAND  OLIGOPOLY  WITH  DIFFERENTIATED  PROD- 
UCTS.  Let  the  demand  for  product  II be  given  by  q,,  = D,(p),  where  p  = 
(Pm;  m  E  N),  and  suppose  that  the  demand  for  good  n  becomes  less 
elastic  as ppn  increases  (a*log(o,,(p))lalog(p,,)ap,,,  >  0  for  m  #  n).  For 
substitute  products,  this  condition  is satisfied  by  the  linear,  logit,  and  CES 
demand  functions,  and  by  translog  demand  with  certain  parameter  restric- 
tions.  Let  the  costs  of  production  be  C,,(q,,)  =  c,q,,  and  let  S,, =  [c,!,  PI. 
Then,  as shown  in  MR,  this  game  has a unique  Nash  equilibrium  and  the 
transformed  game  with  payoffs  log(?r,l)  is a  supermodular  game.’  It  then 
follows  from  Theorem  10 that  r/O%(S) is  a singleton,  so  a  process  {x(t)} 
converges  to  the  unique  equilibrium  if  and  only  if  {x(t)}  is consistent  with 
adaptive  learning. 
EXAMPLE  3:  GENERAL  EQUILIBRIUM  WITH  GROSS  SUBSTITUTES.  Ar- 
row  and  Hurwicz  (1958)  and  Arrow  et  al.  (1959)  proved  that  any  general 
equilibrium  system  satisfying  the  gross  substitutability  condition  is stable 
under  a class of  continuous-time  tatonnement  price  adjustment  processes. 
Because  the  definitions  and  proofs  in  this  paper  make  no  use  of  the  hy- 
pothesis  that  time  is discrete,  our  theorems  can  be applied  to  these  contin- 
uous-time  models  as  well  as to  the  discrete  models  that  are  more  com- 
monly  used  to  describe  learning  in  games. 
For  the  general  equilibrium  system,  suppose  that  there  are L  +  1 com- 
modities  and  that  one  is specified  as the  muneraire.  Let  there  be L  players 
and  let  player  n name  a price  pn E  S,  =  [O,m];  player  IZ may  be  called  the 
“market  maker”  for  good  n.  We  assume  that  the  excess  demand  for 
commodity  12  is q,,  =  qn(p)  and  that  it  has  the  following  properties:  qn is 
continuous,  nonincreasing  in  p,,  and  nondecreasing  in  p-,,  (gross  substi- 
K  Moulin defines  dominance  solvability  using  weak  dominance,  but  his  argument  can  be 
extended  to  the  case  of  strong  dominance  with  no  difficulty.  Alternatively,  the  same  conch- 
sion  can  be  reached  using  the  theory  of  supermodular  games.  See  Milgrom  and  Roberts 
(1990). 
9 To  verify  this,  observe  that  a*~,lap,dp,  = a*log[(p,  -  c,)D,(p)l/ap,ap,  = [#log(D,(p))/ 
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tutes).  Also,  q,(m,p-,)  <  0  and  qn(O,p,)  >  0.  Let  player  n’s  payoff  be 
given  by  r,(p)  =  -(q,,(p)I.  By  inspection,  any  pure  strategy  Nash  equilib- 
riump  of  this  game  is a competitive  equilibrium,  that  is,  q(p)  =  0.  Arrow 
and  Hurwicz  showed  that,  with  these  assumptions,  there  is  a  unique 
competitive  equilibrium.  It  is  shown  in  MS  that  this  game  is  one  with 
strategic  complementarities.  Therefore,  by  Theorem  IO,  CP(S)  =  {p}. 
In  conjunction  with  Theorem  7,  this  is a powerful  conclusion.  To  illus- 
trate  its force,  suppose  that  each  market  maker  bases  the  price  adjustment 
on  some  distributed  lag  estimate  using  past  realized  price  choices  of  the 
other  market  makers.  Any  distributed  lag will  do;  and  each  market  maker 
can  use  a different  distribution  and  the  price  process  can  start  anywhere. 
The  process  will  always  converge  to  the  competitive  equilibrium. 
THEOREM  12.  For  any  family  of  probability  distributions  G,  (n  = 
1  2.  *.  , N)  on  [O,w)  and  any  p(O),  q(0)  E  RN, ij" 
h(t)  = I,’ qnbn(th p-At -  s)ldGnW  + (1 -  G,(tNq.(0)  (*I 
and  if  demand  satisfies  the  assumptions  stated  above,  then  p(t)  converges 
to  the  unique  competitive  equilibrium. 
Proof.  Fix  E and  define  T(i,  t) =  {p(s)  1  i I  s <  t} and  D(i,  t)  =  U&(T(i, 
t)).  Since  qn( p,, , p-,)  is nonincreasing  in pn , D(l,  t) is an  interval  which  we 
may  write  as  [p(i,  t),  p(i,  t)].  Since  T(i,  t)  grows  with  increasing  t  and 
since  U”  is  monotone,  D(i,  t)  grows  with  increasing  t.  Hence, 
p(l,  r) can  only  decrease  and  p(l,  t)  increase  with  t.  - 
Suppose  that  p,(t)  e  D,,(t^,  t),  for  example,  p,(t)  >  p,,(i,  t).  Then 
qn(pn(t),  p-J  <  -E  for  all p  E  T(i,  t).  So,  by  (*),  there  is a i such  that  if  t 
>  tand  p,(t)  $  D,(i,  t),  then  b,,(t)  <  -c/2.  Hence,  (%)(Vr  >  I> p,,(t)  < 
P,(i,  t).  Similarly,  (&)(Vt  >  7) p,,(t)  >  p,,(i,  t).  These  imply  that  p,,(t)  E 
D,(i,  t),  so  {p(t)}  is  consistent  with  adaptive  learning  using  u”.  The  de- 
sired  conclusion  then  follows  from  Theorem  7.  n 
Thus,  for  example,  if  information  processing  is  delayed  so  that  the 
market  can  adjust  current  prices  only  on  the  basis  of  last  quarter’s  de- 
mand,  prices  will  nevertheless  converge  to  the  competitive  equilibrium 
levels. 
Extensions  of  Theorem  11 are  easily  found.  The  lag  coefficients  G,(s) 
can  be  replaced  by  nonstationary  coefficients  H,(s,  t),  provided  inf,H,,(., 
t)  is a probability  distribution.  This  extension  allows  the  possibility  that 
the  demand  data  used  for  price  adjustment  in  the  various  goods  markets 
become  available  only  at  nonsynchronized  discrete  time  intervals.  Simi- 
larly,  various  transformations  of  the  demand  data  in  the  integrand  and  of 
the  rate  of  adjustment  can  be  accommodated.  For  example,  tin(t)  might  be 98  MILGROM  AND  ROBERTS 
set  equal  to  + 1 or  -  1,  according  to  whether  the  integral  is  positive  or 
negative. 
4.  DISCUSSION 
In  general  games,  our  conditions  of  consistency  with  adaptive  (or  so- 
phisticated)  learning  impose  a joint  restriction  on  the  game  and  the  play- 
ers’  learning  processes.  It  is  hardly  a  surprise  that  one  can  express  a 
necessary  condition  for  convergence  to  equilibrium  in  this  general  form. 
It  is  rather  more  surprising  that  the  condition  is  sufficient,  by  itself,  to 
imply  “convergence”  into  the  set  of  serially  undominated  strategies  and 
especially  that  it  is  so  easy  to  prove  that  best  reply  dynamics,  fictitious 
play,  and  various  other  processes  are  consistent  with  adaptive  learning 
for  all  normal-form  games  in  the  broad  class  that  we  have  studied.  A 
second  surprise  is that  for  certain  (nongeneric)  examples  of  games  that 
have  historically  attracted  the  interest  of  economists,  the  necessary  learn- 
ing  conditions  are  also  sufficient  to  imply  that  behavior  converges  to  the 
unique  equilibrium. 
It  had  once  been  thought  that  convergence  in  these  games  that  econo- 
mists  have  studied  depended  very  much  on  the  algorithms  that  were  used. 
For  example,  in the  general  equilibrium  example,  the  analogy  with  known 
results  about  optimization  algorithms  inspired  some  to  think  that  the 
damping  imposed  by  the  continuous  time  dynamics  played  an  important 
role  in facilitating  convergence  (see the  discussion  in Arrow  and  Hurwicz 
(1958)).  One  of  the  lessons  of  our  analysis  is  that  convergence  can  be 
almost  solely  a property  of  the  game  being  studied:  “nearly  everything” 
converges  to  equilibrium  in  the  three  economic  applications  that  we  stud- 
ied. 
Generic  games  do  not  enjoy  the  special  structure  that  we have  exploited 
in our  analysis  for  applications.  It  is still  important,  therefore,  to  explore 
processes  that  are  robustly  convergent  for  a wider  class  of  games,  and 
perhaps  for  all games.  The  hope  is that  such  a theory  would  be  analogous 
to  the  theory  of  “refinements,”  predicting  the  relative  likelihood  of  vari- 
ous  equilibria  as the  outcome  of  learning  in  a way  that  might  be  tested  in 
laboratory  experiments.  Jordan  (1991)  makes  progress  along  that  line, 
showing  that  in a model  where  uncertainty  about  competitors’  play  can  be 
represented  as  due  to  differences  in  types,  if  all  the  players  engage  in 
Bayesian  learning  about  each  others’  types,  then  play  converges  to  a full 
information  Nash  equilibrium-a  stronger  conclusion  than  we  have  ob- 
tained  for  general  learning  models.  Jordan’s  model  provides  an  example 
of  a  setting  in  which  one  might  usefully  investigate  which  equilibria  are 
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APPENDIX:  PROOF OF THEOREM 9 
Let  M(xn,  t)  be  the  number  of  experiments  using  x,  conducted  by 
player  n  by  time  t  and  let  M(t)  be  the  expected  total  number  of  experi- 
ments  using  all the  player’s  strategies.  Let  x-,Jt,  w) be the  strategy  combi- 
nation  played  at date  c by  n’s  competitors.  Fix  i and  define  T =  {x(t)  1  t  2 
i,  t f$ D},  where  D  is the  set of  dates  at  which  experiments  are  conducted. 
Since  the  strategy  sets are  finite,  there  is some  date  i 2  i by  which  all the 
strategies  in  T,,, for  all m  #  n  have  already  been  played  and  the  “‘justifi- 
able”  strategy  profiles  are  eventually  limited  to  those  in  U(T). 
Suppose  that  x,,  4  U,,(T).  To  establish  that  the  play  is consistent  with 
adaptive  learning,  we  need  to  show  that  there  is some  date  t’  after  which 
xn is no  longer  played,  except  during  periods  of  experimentation.  Since  S,, 
is finite  and  x,  @ U,,(T),  Cly,,  E S,,)(~E >  ONVz E  T) ~T,,(x,,  , Z-J  <  T,,(Y,,  , 
z-,,)  +  2.5. Let  P(x,,,  t,  o)  be  the  total  payoff  at experimental  dates  when 
x,  is  played  and  define  P( y,, ,  1.  w)  similarly.  Suppressing  w  from  the 
notation,  we  are  given  that  n will  not  play  x,, at any  nonexperimental  date 
where  P(x,,  , t)lM(x,,  , t)  <  P( y,, , r)lM(  y,, ,  t),  so  it  suffices  to  show  that, 
with  probability  one,  there  exists  a date  after  which  this  inequality  always 
holds.  By  the  Strong  Law  of  Large  Numbers,  M(x,,  , [)/M(r)  and  M(  y,, , t)l 
M(t)  both  converge  almost  surely  to  I/  1 S,, 1  (where  1  S,, I is the  cardinality 
of  S,,).  Consequently,  it  suffices  to  show  that  for  large  t,  P(x,,,  t)lM(r)  < 
P(y,,  [)/M(r)  or  that  P(x,, , t) < P(y,,  , t) -  FM(~)/  Is,,~. Observe  that  M(t)  = 
c  ?<I En,. 
Let  A/2  be  a bound  for  InnI and  let  t’  be  large  enough  that  for  all player 
indexes  m  and  all  t  >  t’,  xCmE,,  E,,  <  E/A. 
Let  F,  be  the  history  of  play  through  time  t.  At  any  date  t  +  1,  the 
choice  by  player  IZ to  experiment  and,  if  so,  which  strategy  to  choose  are 
(by  assumption)  independent  of  X-,Jt  +  1). So, 
ElP(xn,  T +I)  -  P(y,,, T +  I) IF,1  -  Ptx,,, T) -  Pty,,, T) =  (.z,.,+,/IS,I) 
. E[~n(xn>  X-,,(T +  1)) -  n,ky,,, x-,,(T +  lNIF,l  < f’tx,,,  7) 
-  p(Yn,  7) -  (2&,,,,+1#nl)E. 
Taking  expectations  and  summing  over  T,  we  get  a telescoping  series 
which  yields 
am,,  t) -  ey,,  t)l <  -(24&I)  $  E,,  =  -(24S,]  )  . M(t). 
Since  17~,]  <  A/2  and  the  probability  of  a change  in [P(x,,  , t)  -  P( y,, , t)] 
from  date  t  -  I  to  date  t  is ~E~+,I]S,,], 100  MILGROM  AND  ROBERTS 
Var[W  n ,  t)  -  P(y,,  t)]  5  (2A24S,()  i:  E,,T =  (2A*d(S,j  )  . M(t). 
If  follows  from  a  supermartingale  convergence  theorem  (Breiman,  1968, 
Theorem  5.23)  that  P(x,,  t)  -  P( yn , t)  +  &M(f)/  I&J is a supermartingale 
converging  to  --cc, 
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